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  Remember ye not the former things, neither consider the things of old. 
 
   --Isaiah 43:18 
 
 I’m speaking here not as uh, the administrator, I'm speaking as a 
 prophet today. 
      --Jim Jones, November 18, 1978 
 
 
On the day of the Jonestown massacre, Jim Jones’s voice on the so-called FBI “Death 
Tape”—the transcripts in the Jonestown Audiotape Primary Project—revealed his 
weirdly compelling performance in many registers and roles, not the least of which was 
as a kind of prophet. Again and again, his voice by turns stammering and composed, 
Jones draws the congregation of the People’s Temple from questions about the past to the 
acting out of his apocalyptic fantasy, where death in an unjust world is better than life in 
it. When reminded by People’s Temple member Christine Miller of his former promise to 
move the community to Russia, should their mission fail in Guyana, Jones dismisses her 
as “a very good agitator,” as backwards-looking, unimportant, and above all, as a delay 
for the arrival of his own version of heaven’s kingdom. If, a denial of the past, its 
promises and traumas, was the means for Jones to enact his November 18 ritual of 
apocalyptic presentness, then a reclamation of the past, through acts of remembering, 
might constitute a contrary motion to Jones’s. Staging a ritual of remembering, or 
anamnesis, would, in other words, constitute the antithesis of Jones’s, and Jonestown’s, 
temporality. This antithesis would serve as an occasion for the re-introduction of an 
historical dimension, making anamnesis a repetition that asserts a disruptive difference. 
(Voegelin 1990, 10-11).   
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My use of the term anamnesis here and throughout this paper draws on the work 
of Eric Voegelin, which attempts to make sense of what he calls the “horizon of 
consciousness” as “a ceaseless act of expanding, ordering, articulating, and correcting 
itself” (Voegelin 1990, 4). The fact that Voegelin regards individual consciousness as 
both a field of activity and an act, as both noun and verb, quite usefully applies to my 
analysis of Fred D’Aguiar’s book-length poem, Bill of Rights (1998). In this paper, I 
intend to read D’Aguiar’s attempt at recovering the past from and through its violences as 
both a representation of Jonestown’s final events and as an ethically and politically 
fraught re-presentation.
1 
Rather than being simply an act of mimesis, Bill of Rights 
performs a transformative ritual aimed at making a new version of the traumatic events of 
Jonestown and at healing the historical wounds inflicted there.  
Bill of Rights represents the subject, topically and in terms of the poem’s split 
speaker, of the Jonestown deaths. Its double-voiced lyrical engagement with imagined 
events, within Jonestown before and after the November, 1978 calamity, construct a self-
alienated speaker whose “triangular journey,” as Hena Maes-Jelineck writes, evokes not 
only the African slave trade through recalled experiences in Brixton, Chattanooga, and 
Kalamazoo but also a “persistent mind enslavement” unique to modernity (Maes-Jelineck 
1997, 211). Drawing a connection between Jim Jones’s cult of personality and William 
Blake’s “mind-forg’d manacles,” Maes-Jelineck conflates modernity with objectivizing 
ideologies of industrialization and conquest that make possible the theory and practice of 
                                                           
1
 For non-fictional works that attempt to recuperate the image of Jonestown, and of 
Jones’s followers, see works by Rebecca Moore (1985, 1988, 1989). Moore’s family was 
directly involved with the Peoples Temple, and her multiple volumes on the subject of 
Jonestown constitute an almost entirely unique documentary resource. 
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slavery.
 2
 Indeed, the flight of D’Aguiar’s speaker to Guyana has strong echoes of the 
claustrophobic conditions aboard a slave ship, with the speaker, “among/ The agile ones, 
curled in the overhead/ Luggage compartment” (D’Aguiar 1998, 2). Maes-Jelineck 
further reads D’Aguiar as using poetry as a “polyphonic instrument” that maps “the 
extraordinary cultural diversity and resources of the English language in Britain and, in 
the process, asserting the people’s human rights” (Maes-Jelineck 1997, 212). But Maes-
Jelineck is unclear about exactly how D’Aguiar’s poetic strategies constitute something 
like “the people’s”—Which people? Where? When?— “bill of rights”—What is the 
nature of the bill? Which rights will it protect? She is likewise unclear about whether 
poetic polyphony, however skillfully deployed, is truly capable of interrupting the 
smooth and continuous functioning of the monomaniacal ideology of a charismatic tyrant 
like Jim Jones. 
Maes-Jelineck’s essay largely summarizes D’Aguiar’s poem as a point of 
departure for her more involved reading of Wilson Harris. And since little else has thus 
far been written on Bill of Rights, I will begin with what I see as a constructive 
juxtaposition. By placing D’Aguiar’s poetics in Bill of Rights alongside those of another 
twentieth-century book-length poem, William Carlos Williams’s Paterson (1963), as well 
                                                           
2
 Although this essay does not specifically address D’Aguiar’s representations of race and 
trauma, Rinaldo Walcott writes compellingly about the traumas of slavery in his essay, 
“Pedagogy and Trauma: The Middle Passage, Slavery, and the Problem of Creolization,” 
in Between Hope and Despair: Pedagogy and the Remembrance of Historical Trauma, 
Roger J. Simon et al., eds. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 
135-52. His view of the process of psychic healing stands parallel to the one I read in 
terms of D’Aguiar’s poetics in this paper in that both processes require a reconnection 
and reintegration to be made after a radical separation or rupture. So, to be a New World 
black person involves both reconnection with a “severed ‘Mother Africa’” and the 
making of a reparation by “breaking away from the mother” and “loving the creolized 
self.” See Walcott, 147.  
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as in the context of Shoah literature, I hope to gain some traction on D’Aguiar’s 
representational strategies and their implications for dealing with cultural trauma. I will 
then situate D’Aguiar’s poetics of language, trauma, and the body, as articulated in his 
critical prose and poetry, in relation to those of Wilson Harris, a fellow Guyanese author 
whose work has been influential to D’Aguiar. Out of these relations emerge some key 
questions: What does it mean for D’Aguiar to write at all about Jonestown, especially 
when it is relatively recent in our collective memory? What does it mean for him to have 
written in the particular ways that he has? Is healing possible through the fictional 
representation of such a past and if so, by what means is healing effected? What is 
language’s role in the representation of a violent past; a past, moreover, whose violence 
was so brutally and abruptly physical? What, in other words, is the place of language in 
recalling violence done to body and mind? Finally, how might we consider D’Aguiar’s 
poetic project in Bill of Rights as performing, or perhaps just as interestingly and 
importantly, failing to perform a ritual of healing that moves against the forgetting of the 
past?  
Since Williams’s long poem, Paterson, deals substantially with historical and 
individual acts of violence, it makes for a point of useful comparison for understanding 
historical trauma in D’Aguiar’s work. Neither D’Aguiar’s nor Williams’s poems is 
especially elegiac, as neither makes mourning its central speech act. Instead, both poets 
problematize mourning as a fraught site of language’s fragility, breakdown, and 
reconstruction. Both present loss through violence as something foundational to the 
formation of a historical subject. In Paterson, the violence suffered by individuals is 
contained within and attended by acts of nation-building in the United States, including 
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the displacement and genocide of Native American peoples, as well as the Middle 
Passage and slave trade. We see in Book 1 the dispossession of Tuscarosa Indians who, 
“forced to leave their country” after a “massacre by the Indians, hanging, and exile,” go 
on to create the racially mixed “Jackson’s Whites” (Williams 1995, 12). This 
dispossession leads to the poem’s central speaker, Dr. Paterson, describing a 'ational 
Geographic photo of “some African chief” and to various ruminations on breasts and 
wives, which gives way again to a journalistic account of Sarah Hemmings, a Paterson 
resident, disappearing on her wedding day in the falls of the river. Placing these events 
alongside one another cancels out the gravity of any one of them; here, all historical 
traumas and their linguistic representations become equalized and equalizing. Paterson’s 
metonymic movement asserts the possibility of remaking the present moment 
linguistically out of the bric-a-brac of disasters big and small. Riddel calls the poem 
“anti-modernist” because of its rejection of transcendent versions either of language or of 
history. 
It is worth mentioning that this sort of leveling of history’s individual events 
works as a kind of inverse of Jones’s logic for mass suicide, although it is not a point I 
wish to pursue at great length here. Jones repeatedly describes the world outside of 
Jonestown as unchanging in its evil, a kind of outward sprawl of injustices. Historical 
time, for Jones, was a bad dream, from which death was the only means to awake. “It’s 
the will of Sovereign Being that this happened to us,” Jones intoned just before the 
cyanide was administered, “that we lay down our lives in protest against what’s been 
done. That we lay down our lives to protest in what’s being done” (“Jonestown 
Audiotape”). He goes on to describe the world as unchangingly and pervasively 
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corrupted: “The criminality of people, the cruelty of people…. There’s, there’s no point, 
there’s no point to this. We are born before our time. They won’t accept us” (“Jonestown 
Audiotape”). Unlike in Williams, however, Jones can only read negatively the 
overwhelming sameness of history’s traumas and, in fact, provides the ultimate rationale 
for the rejection of the idea of futurity itself in his comments about killing Jonestown’s 
children: “And I don’t think we should sit here and take any more time for our children to 
be endangered, for if they come after our children and we give them our children, then 
our children will suffer forever” (“Jonestown Audiotape”).  
Indeed, because of, or despite, the representation of historical traumas in 
Paterson, Joseph N. Riddel reads Williams’s poem as engaging in a poetics of jeu, or 
play. He describes the poem’s linguistic opening not onto anomic confusion or despair 
but onto endless metonymy, or more specifically, onto metonymic relations that embody 
through language the endlessly expansive forms of desire and human freedom. Following 
Williams, Riddel locates a foundational violence in language itself, and specifically, in a 
linguistic tradition that has celebrated and enshrined the mimetic, representational 
faculties of language. The “origin of writing,” though, lies in an “original act of 
unconcealment, which involves a breaking up (deconstruction) of the already 
unconcealed, those received historical forms” (Riddel 1974, 58).  To recover the 
“primordial roots of language” requires the poet endlessly to “de-center the idea of a 
center” and maybe most fundamentally, by refusing mimesis’s false promise of 
representing the past without the mediation of the imagination.  
For Riddel, Williams’s African chief must give way to Sarah Hemmings, who 
must, in turn, make way linguistically for other murders and deaths and disappearances in 
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the torrential litany of historical violence that becomes the poem. In Paterson, there is no 
risk, either ethical or aesthetic, in representing historical trauma, because each individual 
case will be decentered by the proliferating existence of other traumas, other accidents, 
displacements, and dispossessions, and by the ordering agency of the imagination in 
recalling traumas. To remember the traumas of a place and its many peoples, then, is to 
undertake the building of a kind of prophylactic house of language: prophylactic because 
its endless metonymic sprawl exemplifies human freedom, and also because such 
remembering is a disruption of and a defense against ideology. Poetic remembering in 
this way entails a systematic reordering of relations. To remember, as Williams does, is, 
in Riddel’s phrasing, to build “a poem, a field of language or a house of being, a 
‘measure’ of things, a ‘relation’” (Riddel 1974, 10).  
In contrast to the rather optimistic vision of language post-trauma that Riddel 
reads in Williams, I read Fred D’Aguiar’s poem, and the representational strategies 
underlying it, as ostensibly constructing a radically dis-integrative and alienated vision of 
language and of subjectivity in the face of cultural violence. By the close of Bill of 
Rights, we see the speaker isolated and despairing of his cultural dislocation; this, in spite 
of his efforts to testify to the events in Jonestown, and in so doing, remake himself as a 
whole person. In testifying to Jones’s madness and to his own violent participation in the 
Guyanese Peoples Temple, his sense of self seems to have only further disintegrated. The 
disintegrative force of trauma and traumatic memory has, of course, also been well-
documented in Shoah literature; the fact that the writing of Paterson coincides roughly 
with World War II and its aftermath also makes Shoah literature a relevant context to this 
paper.  
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In his work, Remnants of Auschwitz (1999), Giorgio Agamben remarks on the 
lacuna that characterizes the testimony of trauma survivors, writing that the gap between 
the traumatic experience and any linguistic representation of it “calls into question the 
very meaning of testimony” (Agamben 1999, 33). Given this lacuna and the 
provisionality of testimony, the only “true” or “complete” witnesses are those who have 
“touched bottom,” those who have died:  
The Shoah is an event without witnesses in the double sense that it is impossible 
to bear witness to it from the inside—since no one can bear witness from the 
inside of death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice—and from 
the outside—since the ‘outsider’ is by definition excluded from the event (1999, 
35). 
 
For Agamben, the paradox of testimony, that neither insider nor outsider can signify the 
traumatic event in a way that constitutes bearing witness, necessitates a reexamination of 
the language of testimony. Accordingly, he turns to a figure from Primo Levi’s account 
of the liberation of the Buna camp in Monowice by Russians, a three year-old boy called 
Hurbinek. Levi describes how this boy began to repeat a word over and over again, “a 
word that no one in the camp can understand and that Levi transcribes as mass-klo or 
matisklo” (1999, 38). This word remains “obstinately secret,” an utterance of what 
Agamben terms a “non-language,” and serves as an example of how testimony might 
approach the silent, forever secret knowledge of the “true witnesses” of trauma. It shows 
how language may “give way to a non-language in order to show the impossibility of 
bearing witness” (1999, 39). In order to bear witness, this senseless sound, this non-
language, must not remain in a condition of “its own non-sense,” but must, in turn, be 
“the voice of something or someone that, for entirely other reasons, cannot bear witness” 
(1999, 39). 
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Agamben’s theorizing of the language of testimony parallels the representation of 
historical violence in Paterson. Both texts underscore the need, in order to bear witness, 
to return to the violent origins of language in historically immanent situations such as that 
of the boy, Hurbinek, or of Native American tribes’ displacement. Where I see 
Williams’s poetics diverge from those of Shoah survivors and theorists is in Williams’s 
use of a kind of deus ex machina for the historical subject. Confronted with historical 
violence, there is in Paterson the sense of being able simply to play among the ruins and 
wreckage of past traumas, and therein to construct a safe dwelling through writing. 
Agamben’s sense of testimony is much more provisional than Williams’s poetics. 
D’Aguiar’s own comments on his poem echo this provisionality in the ways he describes 
the lastingness of the wound in the survivor’s memory as well as the evacuation of trust 
in the survivor’s consciousness.  
D’Aguiar reflects on the historical and psychic wounds that Jonestown inflicted at 
the end of his lecture, “Made in Guyana”: “The Guyanese interior was bruised by the 
Jonestown settlement but it is now overgrown and returned to the wild. The scar is not 
physical in terms of landscape—that has healed—but human, and psychic. Once you 
know about Jonestown, how can you trust ideology or charisma or have faith again? A 
body and mind are emptied of all three” (D’Aguiar 1998, 13). For D’Aguiar, the 
condition of knowing trauma, even trauma experienced only second hand, amounts to a 
decisive loss that is at once cataclysmic and oddly empowering. It is cataclysmic because 
it signals a rupture—“a body and mind… emptied” of trust in “ideology or charisma” or 
“faith”—, empowering because traumatic knowing creates critical consciousness: 
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D’Aguiar’s trauma survivor, having been “emptied” by both physical and psychical 
violence, is no longer caught, or, it seems, catchable within the spell of ideology.  
Having been evacuated by violence of naïve optimism or belief in Jones, the 
subjectivity of D’Aguiar’s Jonestown survivor resembles that described by Walter 
Benjamin in his Theses on the Philosophy of History. There, Benjamin answers 
D’Aguiar’s questions—“how can you trust ideology or charisma or have faith again?”— 
by describing the “emergency situation” that all survivors live in, and by calling for a  
revolutionary consciousness (a “real state of emergency”) that highlights the abuses of 
tradition by the ruling classes (Benjamin, section VIII, online). Although Benjamin’s 
remarks were made in the context of Nazi fascism, their characterization of oppression 
through exploitation of the concepts of history and tradition is appropriate for making 
sense of the “emergency situation” that occurred in Jonestown, as well. The messianic 
consciousness that Benjamin calls for from the oppressed also raises the question, for 
D’Aguiar’s speaker, of whether such an empowered subjectivity ever appears in Bill of 
Rights, and whether the revolutionary ideal is possible for those who survive violence. 
For D’Aguiar, it is clear that other forms of trust and relation must take root, or 
else the survivor may become merely cynical. D’Aguiar writes, “The romantic gene—so 
necessary for regeneration—is eviscerated and replaced by the cynic. One is left in that 
cynical condition and then expected to raise children, and raise hope for the future” 
(D’Aguiar “Made in Guyana” 1998, 13).  But this is a decidedly ambiguous concluding 
sentence to a passage that describes the critically empowering aspects of trauma. It is 
especially ambiguous in describing the fate of the poetic persona in Bill of Rights. Does 
historical trauma, when reenacted, serve as a source of agency and healing for the subject 
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who repeats it? Or does historical trauma repeated engender further suffering? Bill of 
Rights suggests that one answer to these questions involves the vexed relation between 
language and the body.    
In both “Made in Guyana” and Bill of Rights, the body and the natural world show 
up as sites of language’s, and meaning’s, departure from the historical dimension and an 
eventual return to it. Describing a child’s sense of the physical world and the limitations 
of language, D’Aguiar writes that it is “as if words alone are never enough for what you 
have to say, and what your body must do about this and that, with this body and that 
body, and this thing and that thing, and here, there and everywhere all at once, and right 
now before time runs out and words go out of season” (D’Aguiar “Made in Guyana” 
1998, 3). Here, the urgency of embodiedness accompanies linguistic relation in creating 
meaning; it also threatens to surpass or overwhelm language’s power to mean, to create 
coherence. The body emerges again and again in D’Aguiar’s writing as the site of a 
Freudian repetition compulsion that, read positively, becomes also the site of cultural 
witnessing and transformation of historical trauma. As the narrator of D’Aguiar’s novel, 
Feeding the Ghosts (1997), pronounces, not ambivalently, the bodies of slaves thrown 
overboard, after being consumed by the sea and transformed into elemental materials, 
“will have to be a witness again” (D’Aguiar 1997, 5). Despite the drowning of the voices 
of the Middle Passage, their memory must be made to speak, to bear witness, and 
D’Aguiar locates their possibility for speaking in the natural world. 
But the act of witnessing that attends Bill of Rights enacts, at first, a poetics of 
language in extremis as a kind of useless tool, reduced to meaningless repetition and 
recombinations in the face of brute physical force. The poem’s double voicing, signaled 
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through italicized and non-italicized typefaces, at first promises a stable subject formation 
by engaging in what Edouard Glissant, in writing about the co-existence of colonial and 
pre-colonial languages within a single nation, terms diglossia or fruitful intertextuality: 
“neither fusion nor confusion, if it is to be fruitful and capable of transcendence, the 
languages that end up involved in it must first have been in charge of their own 
specificities” (Glissant 1997, 118). D’Aguiar’s speaker’s multiple selves correspond, 
albeit quite roughly, to the ritual process of initiatory exuberance, luminal anxiety, and 
reintegrated stability. These selves also correspond, in tones and registers, to the weird 
ecstasies and traumas of the Jonestown experience and are indeed many-voiced. The 
poem invokes calypso song (“Water in the well…/Is not the truth I a-tell,/ Is pure lie) 
(D’Aguiar 1998, 23) among many other musical genres, including 1970s British reggae 
(Steel Pulse), American pop (Fine Young Cannibals), and contemporary jazz (Cassandra 
Wilson). Biblical references and registers (or their inversion, as in “Holy the serpent of 
temptation/ Holy Pontius Pilate holy Judas Iscariot”)
 
(D’Aguiar 1998, 6) appear 
alongside pop culture (Kodak Instamatics, Seiko watches, nunchakas, etc.). Despite these 
many intertexts and cultural specificities, Bill of Rights’ speaker is rarely “in charge” of 
their meanings. Instead, these cultural artifacts form a brittle collage assembled under 
duress, a kind of ersatz and distracted subjectivity culled out of fragments that subside 
from the speaker’s consciousness as quickly as they arise. To invoke T.S. Eliot, whose 
also shored the fragments of culture against his Wasteland’s ruin, there is no 
transcendence, no still center to this turning world (Eliot 1963, 177).   
Instead, as the poem goes on, the motion of its world starts to spin radically out of 
control. When its speaker is most “out of [his] carnivorous brain,” language’s 
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representational capacities start to strain under his psychological burdens and traumas. 
Describing his jealousy at having his lover taken by Jones for his own, the speaker 
ruefully notes Jones’s predilection for virgins: Jones is “aroused by my girl’s obvious/ 
Plural virginity” (D’Aguiar 1998, 31). The speaker’s world then turns cartoonish, and he 
feels “like Coyote, always out of reach/ Of roadrunner,” when he sees a jeep, a tangible 
contact with the outside world, “overshoot/ This commune” (D’Aguiar 1998, 32), the air 
filling with the jeep’s/roadrunner’s “beep-beep.” Elsewhere, doing violence to others “on 
a mission” in nearby Georgetown, the speaker runs into a demonstration, presumably 
against Jim Jones and his followers. Breaking his “stave of greenheart” and “nunchakas 
too,” the speaker’s italicized voice goes on callously to boast that he was “unhurt by their 
women screaming/ Unhurt by their children crying….” The people that he encounters and 
beats are only ever occasions for the speaker’s glib deployment of pop slogans, “souls” 
who, “discontented” and “ungrateful” are, like the macho persona that the speaker adopts 
when he is at his most violent, “cruisin’-for-a-bruisin’” (D’Aguiar 1998, 36).  
It is under extreme pressure that D’Aguiar’s speaker is most heteroglossic and 
least transcendent. In moments of most extreme crisis, when the violence of his situation 
is most immanent, his narration turns paranoiacally repetitive. We might recall 
Agamben’s discussion of the “Bohemian” boy, Hubinek, and Levi’s description of the 
word he repeated over and over again. “It was not,” writes Levi, “always exactly the 
same word, but it was certainly an articulated word; or better, several slightly different 
articulated words, experimental variations of a theme, on a root, perhaps even on a name” 
(Levi 1986, 192). We also see such variations in the italicized anaphoras in Bill of Rights. 
As with Hubinek, the repetitions of D’Aguiar’s speaker appear as privacies of the 
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speaker’s mind that attempt to recuperate language that has been distorted beyond 
recognition by the life of the camp. The repetitive phrasings of D’Aguiar’s speaker read 
like a privacy that has turned nightmarish. They resemble tortured schoolbook grammar 
exercises or, to use a reference fitting for Bill of Rights, Mad Libs, conjugating verbs, 
mixing and matching parts of speech, to make a litany that has been both evacuated of 
meaning and that becomes, nevertheless, a kind of consolation:  
What came to pass 
Has come to pass 
Has come and gone 
Came and went 
 
What came to pass 
That has not always passed 
Already came and passed 
What comes must pass… (D’Aguiar 1998, 17) 
 
Shuffling through all grammatical permutations of his original phrase, “And God like a 
man in our midst/ Telling what came to pass,” the speaker’s repetitions enact a poetics of 
arbitrariness, in which singing to oneself shows up only as a childlike consolation, whose 
impotence is apparent in the face of Jones’s physical and mental abuses. 
Given the speaker’s encounter with a “feisty griot” who provides him with “a 
story full of the warm South” and a lullaby played on the bone flute left over from a 
devoured canary, these repetitions also read like hollowed-out or ineffectual chants 
(D’Aguiar 1998,14-15). In representing ritual chanting in his poem D’Aguiar conflates 
the typically West African figure of the griot, or praise singer, with that of the distinctly 
Amerindian bone flute. Wilson Harris comments on the latter figure in the preface to his 
1960 novel, The Palace of the Peacock, noting that the “Carib bone flute” is 
metaphorically both the “spirit-bone of water” of Guyana’s numerous rivers and literally 
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a flute “hollowed from the bone of an enemy in time of war” from which “specters arose” 
(Harris 1960, 9). In D’Aguiar’s poem, the griot denies this spirit bone to the speaker, 
devouring the canary from which it might be fashioned and leaving the speaker with 
nothing. Indeed, by the poem’s conclusion, the speaker confesses to having failed to 
“hollow an enemy’s bone/ Into a flute.” Instead, he has become a kind of bone flute 
himself, capable only of mimicking or channeling others’ music and unable to resist the 
ventriloquism not just of Jones but of all cultural influences (D’Aguiar 1998, 130). The 
poem’s many discursive registers finally overwhelm and deny the possibility of 
subjective coherence.  
Devoid of a griot’s historical and religious effectiveness, the speaker’s use of 
repetition also lacks the dialogical element of a griot’s performance, as the speaker can 
only respond to his own calls through italicized speech. What becomes ever more 
conspicuously absent in Bill of Rights is a community who responds.
3
 The epistolary 
format of the poem, with each “entry” standing as a letter to the speaker’s friend in 
Brixton, “L--,” further underscores this fact of the speaker’s isolation, as does the 
revelation that “L—” has been “cut down by the big C;/ My letters to him, all wait for 
me” (D’Aguiar 1998, 124). Resigned and alone, the circle closes and the only addressee 
for the speaker’s letters, his acts of witnessing, is he himself.  
Prior to this revelation, though, the speaker’s monologic situation moves him to 
turn to the land itself as companion and addressee. Often in his failed chants, it is the 
natural world that appears anaphorically, as when the speaker, having given up on 
                                                           
3
 See Walter F. Pitts and Vincent L. Wimbush, Old Ship of Zion: The Afro-Baptist Ritual 
in the African Diaspora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61. 
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recovering his lost Seiko wristwatch, locates a new source of temporal orientation in the 
sun: 
 Light hoods our eyes 
 Light creases our foreheads 
 Light makes our bones porous 
 Light darkens our skin 
 Light peels our heads 
 Light lifts us off the ground 
 Light puts us underground… (1998, 43) 
 
The speaker’s anaphoras attempt to create meaning out of a scene that is meaningless to 
him. They are, again, satirical versions of shamanistic song, or chanting. Their satire 
consists in the fact that, as so often happens in this poem, the formal acting out of a 
transcendent gesture does not guarantee that it will be meaningful, let alone transcendent. 
In his hunger for a spiritual father, for release from that father, from Jonestown, and for 
plain, literal food, his language gets pulled inexorably as into a black hole and toward 
primal and bodily reference points like “light,” “belly,” “fire.” Working in the fields, he 
imagines being utterly self-sufficient, living off the land with his “fingers [as] my knife 
and fork,” using “grass to wipe my ass.” But this fantasy quickly gives way to simple 
hunger, “a growl/ In my belly and my belly on my mind.” Quickly, the hunger consumes 
all else—dreams, mother, father, wife, children—until the speaker is left, at the end of 
language’s meaningfulness, in a tautology of simple physical need: “My belly in my 
belly” (D’Aguiar 1998, 45).   
Here, physical necessity reduces language to a condition of impotence. It is also, 
however, the means by which language, to use D’Aguiar’s phrase, becomes “emptied 
out” of its former meanings. This evacuation is what I want to call the initiatory moment 
in the ritual of anamnesis that the poem stages, a moment of evacuation and separation 
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from language’s protective and enclosing properties, and of confrontation with a physical 
world that is more than just, to use Wilson Harris’s phrase, “the void of civilization.” 
This initiatory moment is equivalent to breaking the spell of ideology that Benjamin calls 
taking “control of a memory” in a “moment of danger”; a moment and a political 
situation of emergency that is essentially ongoing (Benjamin, online). Part of the 
uniqueness of D’Aguiar’s version of the poetics of memory, though, lies in his 
engagement with the natural world in the ritual process of recalling the past. In 
D’Aguiar’s Jonestown, language’s mimetic power is doubly threatened by ideology and 
by the material world’s capacity to trump any imagined world, again and again. So, the 
speaker’s physical expulsion from the false Eden in Guyana parallels an epistemological 
expulsion from an Adamic paradise, where the right names correspond faithfully to the 
things of the world. Expelled from meaning by violence, thrown back upon the physical 
world in its brutal and raw materiality, D’Aguiar’s speaker is banished into a double 
wilderness: into the literal jungle of Guyana and into the figurative jungle of 
meaninglessness.  
This double expulsion appears maybe most trenchantly when the speaker 
addresses his lover. Near the end of Bill of Rights, we see the speaker, through a poem, 
addressing his lost beloved, an indigenous woman, with whom he falls in love with early 
in his time at Jonestown but whom Jones eventually impregnates. Reduced to sound and 
circular logic, the speaker’s language becomes the “poetry” that struggles to assert not 
just his desperate longing for his long-unnamed lover but also to transcend the in-folding 
temporality and “despotic authority” that the speaker doesn’t even have the “dreads to 
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shake at.” So he professes to his lover, somewhat melodratically, that “When poetry dies 
my love for you dies too” (D’Aguiar 1998, 54).
4
   
Oddly, though, this profession of faith in language’s transcendence of its 
historical situation gets twisted, derailed by its ending, when the speaker meanders away 
from a defiant expression of “us versus timelessness” to a formulation, where the 
distinctly Jonesian timelessness is equated with love itself:  
Our love no less than time no more 
Than life itself us in that love 
With nothing to lose if we lose our lives 
Since that love has slipped from time 
From Death and lives as life itself (D’Aguiar 1998, 55) 
 
In this formulation, we can read Jones’s talk of “revolutionary suicide” insinuated into 
what begins as a declaration of love’s power to revolt against the eradication of time, or 
against Jones’s denial of an outside world and history. What this love poem suggests is a 
different role for language than what Riddel sees in Williams. Jones’s rhetoric and its 
trajectory of displacement and distraction cannot, it seems, be countered through 
language alone; indeed, language repeats the dominant ideology even when it sets out to 
be most subversive. This is maybe the key risk that D’Aguiar’s poem describes in re-
imagining the traumatic past. At both the level of the fictional persona, caught within the 
act of narrating and remembering Jonestown, and at the level of the poem, which 
involves us as witnesses to its own act of witness, there is the constant threat of the poem 
representing the past in ways that dull or mute its violence. This risk also underscores the 
                                                           
4
 For much of the poem, the speaker says about his lover that she is simply “Someone’s 
wife, she was Waiyaki or Makusi.” After her suicide/infanticide, though, she takes on the 
name “Tikka.” 
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need for language to be ritually evacuated of its prior meanings in order for it to become 
a useful tool in the making of a stable self. 
 D’Aguiar addresses this potential for the muting or dulling of historical trauma in 
a 1999 interview, where he explains his choice of the long poem as generically best 
suited for re-imagining the events of Jonestown: 
The other thing that struck me was how fragmented the experience must have 
been for a survivor of Jonestown as it is for those who have lived through 
Guyana’s transition from a British colony to an independent state. So it could not 
be a work of coherence as many novels turn out using linear narrative. I found the 
long poem, broken and fractured as it can be, to be the best form for this subject 
(D’Aguiar 2009, online). 
 
Beyond his formal concerns for representing the fragmented experience of a Jonestown 
survivor, or what he sees as the long poem’s lack of “coherence” and therefore its 
suitability for representing an internally divided, traumatized subjectivity, D’Aguiar also 
stresses the need to situate his poem’s act of memory within the context of Guyana’s 
colonial past. Arguing that “the post-colonial has robbed the ex-colony of its continuing 
colonial dependence by theorising the story out of the situation of the colonial 
consciousness,” D’Aguiar aims to recover both, “to put both back into that situation” 
(D’Aguiar 2009, online). 
The colonial context of Bill of Rights informs the speaker’s performance in literal 
and figurative ways alike. Literally, the earth, the Guyanese jungle, is a presence that 
frustrates the stability of both the speaker and the Peoples Temple. Figuratively, the 
continuing presence of colonization appears in the contrast between the Jonestown 
project and a subtly backgrounded indigenous presence. In terms of the complications 
that wilderness as a physical force presents, we see the pervasive humidity of the jungle 
complicating the speaker’s efforts to enjoy the quasi-militaristic aspects of his Jonestown 
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identity. The rain “rusts our joints” (D’Aguiar 1998, 6) and leaves the speaker 
prematurely “arthritic at thirty-three,” with an uzi “seized” by “damp everywhere” and 
himself with “the runs and chigoe,/ A fungus culture between [his] toes” (D’Aguiar 1998 
8, 34). The Guyanese land likewise resists the community-building efforts of Jonestown 
to make livable dwellings, with the jungle’s “autochthonous wood” blunting or breaking 
“electric/ Saw after electric saw// In half” (D’Aguiar 1998, 7). This wood, the speaker 
concludes, in a blurring of the physical and the psychic, the historical and the mythical, 
“must have hardened itself/ Against further loss of face.” In another  rapid catalogue, 
processes of colonization, exploitation, and pollution are collapsed and accelerated. The 
Jonestown presence in Guyana is likened to less than a wave of the hand to dismiss a 
mosquito:  
To wave a mosquito from the forehead 
Takes more effort than to clear this forest 
Clear this continent of all of its wood 
Burn that wood into smoke into cloud 
Spread that could over the entire planet 
Sink our planet into a black hole 
Send that hole spinning into unknown space (D’Aguiar 1998, 5)  
 
That this process figures so early in the speaker’s Jonestown experience suggests his 
sense of the fragility of Jonestown’s neo-colonial presence, a sense of its belatedness or 
at least of its pathetic re-enactment of Spanish conquistadores’ destruction of indigenous 
cultures and landscapes (the speaker likens his machete to a “cutlass” that “bounces off” 
the jungle’s vines) (D’Aguiar 1998, 24). Perhaps, like Williams’s depiction of the 
ephemeral human presences in Paterson, New Jersey, rendered in part through the generic 
ephemera of newspaper and magazine articles, the Guyanese jungle’s most powerful 
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resistance to colonial encroachments is its stubborn capacity simply to outlast what is 
human. 
In light of these complications and frustrations that the natural world presents to 
the poem’s speaker, we might wonder whether there is anything of a salvific possibility 
in the presence of wilderness. Taking into account D’Aguiar’s remarks on the body and 
the material world as originating and revisionary sites for human meaning, it would seem 
that a return to wilderness, to the Guyanese jungle stripped of its toxic human presences, 
would make possible a journey toward recuperation and renewal. Indeed, D’Aguiar’s 
reading of Wilson Harris’s encounter with nature seems to support this view of the 
recuperative power of the natural world. D’Aguiar describes Harris’s natural world as a 
modified version of that of the Romantics. “The difference between Harris’s vision and 
that of the Romantics,” writes D’Aguiar, “is that nature, in a Wilson Harris novel, not 
only instructs us in its many contradictory truths, it also alters how we perceive those 
truths” (D’Aguiar 1998, “Made in Guyana,” 5).   
Elsewhere in D’Aguiar’s and Harris’s writings, however, the natural world’s 
“contradictory truths” and recuperative power appear more ambivalent. In Harris’s 
experimental fiction, Da Silva da Silva’s Cultivated Wilderness (1999), for instance, the 
figure of the “wildernesse” necessarily, even compulsively, entails a confrontation with 
the violence of the past. It is the deeply storied landscape that the titular character, a “mad 
painter,” tries to capture with his art, an art that requires 
a compulsive excavation in ‘wildernesse’ flesh and blood; and a confrontation 
dawns with soluble uniform that sticks to the psychology of each historic body in 
cradle or grave; a confrontation that may encourage the arousal of daemonic 
forces as freedom (bent upon the creation of genuine freedom) or may succumb to 
the inevitability or refinement of violence… (Harris 1977, 73). 
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This archaeological dig is something D’Aguiar’s protagonist undertakes accidentally, out 
of necessity. The jungle confronts him with both physical and emotional hardships that 
lead to a reassessment of his relationship to Jones. For both D’Aguiar and Harris, then, 
the dialogue that Harris’s “wildernesse” demands entails a transformation of our human 
relations not just with the natural world but also with one another. It is a confrontation 
with “historic bod[ies]” and minds to which history’s violences “stick,” a confrontation 
with ancestors and ancestral places that continue to haunt us. This “wildernesse,” or the 
Guyanese interior in the case of Jonestown, stands not as an inert object or void but 
always as an agent for the potential redemption of human destructiveness.
5
 Its continual 
excavation, for D’Aguiar and Harris alike, is an excavation of our own relationship to 
historical trauma and, in large part, to the violence of colonialism. 
 For Harris, there is more at stake than just the recovery of an historical and 
colonial past, though, as his fictional narrator, Francisco Bone, suggests in his “Letter 
from Francisco Bone to W.H.” There, Bone describes the consequences of surviving 
Jonestown as difficult for the resulting necessity to engage not just the historically recent 
past but also a mythic past that opens up to the present survivor: “It is essential,” he 
writes, “to create a jigsaw in which ‘pasts’ and ‘presents’ and likely or unlikely ‘futures’ 
are the pieces that multitudes in the self employ in order to bridge chasms in historical 
memory” (Harris 1999, 49). Using a term from Frances Yates’s work, History as an Art 
of Memory, Bone calls this creation of a memorial “jigsaw” the practice of “Memory 
theatre.” He goes on to describe this sort of remembering as an immersion in traumas 
                                                           
5
 As Harris puts it in Jonestown, “The Wilderness comes into its own as extra-human 
territory which unsettles the hubris of a human-centered cosmos that has mired the globe 
since the Enlightenment.” See Wilson Harris, Jonestown (London: Faber, 1997), 97. 
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rather than as a rejection of them, and as both antithesis of, and remedy for, a sort of 
overdetermined identity or “predatory coherence”: “The trauma that I suffered in 
Jonestown may have imprisoned me absolutely in a plot of fate. But thank God! it 
aroused me instead to contemplate a hidden mathematics within the body of language… 
Language is deeper than ‘frames’, it transgresses against the frames that would make us 
prisoners of eternity in the name of one creed or dogma or ideology” (Harris 1999, 49).  
This journey back to the “hidden mathematics” of “chaos” in language itself leads 
Francisco Bone to write his “Dream Book,” which he dreamed as “translating from a 
fragmented text or texts that already existed…” (Harris 1999, 50). For Bone, these 
fragmented texts, in turn, are residues or “apparitions” not just of a colonial past but of 
the “hidden textualities” of a pre-Columbian place. 
Arguably, D’Aguiar’s speaker undertakes a similar project to that of Bone in that 
his unanswered letters, forming, in effect, the long poem we read as the text of Bill of 
Rights, attempt to escape their own “plot of fate” through the poetic means discussed thus 
far in this paper: multivocality, anaphoric chanting, and love poems and letters to worlds 
that are discursively beyond and apart from Jonestown. When faced with the wilderness 
of the jungle surrounding Jonestown, he also attempts to bridge historical and “mythic” 
memory, Guyanese natives and Jonestown outsiders, as seen in his fraught relations with 
Tikka and with the oddly displaced, recurring Aztec figure of Quetzalcoatl. In effect, 
though, what Harris calls the “hidden textualities” of pre-contact Guyana become just 
another text, another material, with which to bridge constructively the internal fracturing 
that results from the speaker’s experience of violence. Rather than having language 
transgress, in some completely successful way, the “frames” of history, D’Aguiar shows 
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us that its necessarily partial and provisional transgressions must proceed through an 
ethical reorientation that is sponsored, in an almost shamanic way, as a facilitator of the 
ritual process, by the presence of the natural world. 
Moving for a moment from discussing the wilderness of the jungle to the 
wilderness of the sea, we might find that the imagining of wilderness as an ethical 
catalyst appears in explicit ways in D’Aguiar’s own novel about the Middle Passage, 
Feeding the Ghosts. Its opening scene dramatizes the 1783 scandal on the slave ship 
Zong, in which 132 slaves were thrown overboard. After Captain Cunningham orders his 
reluctant first mate, Kelsal, to throw the first two people into the sea, a long description 
follows, in which the elements—the wind, the water—assume a voice and a presence that 
threaten not a remonstrance of the crews’ murders but a radical disorientation. The voice 
of the wind filling the ship’s sails speaks what the voiceless slaves below decks already 
know: it “knew Africa and how this sea was nowhere and how their destination was not a 
beginning but an end without ending” (D’Aguiar 1997, 27). In effect, the wilderness of 
the sea in its “knowing” creates, or reflects accurately, the cosmic and ethical 
disorientations of empire. The practices of slavery and colonization, and the genocidal 
logic that supports such practices, are known by the natural world to be a kind of living 
death, a permanent condition of being lost: 
The voice above deck knew… that if the sea came to an end and another land 
suggested itself to them they would be lost forever but not dead, lost but never to 
be found. And love would be nowhere: behind them and impossible to recover; a 
flat line in the wake of the ship where the sky bowed down to the sea or the sea 
ascended into the sky. Love was lost somewhere in the very sea with its limitless 
capacity to swallow love, slaves, ships, memories (D’Aguiar 1997, 27).   
 
Here, the wilderness voices the historical and ethical dimensions that Captain 
Cunningham’s order attempts tyrannically to silence. But does Bill of Rights’ speaker 
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have access to this sort of ethical knowing? Do his invocations of the body and the 
natural world allow him access to a coherent subjectivity, a safe dwelling in the house of 
language? I would argue that the subjectivity at the poem’s conclusion is, despite the 
speaker’s best attempts, a dis-integrated one.  
This disintegration occurs despite the availability of what Harris’s character, 
Francisco Bone, calls the mythic. In the poem, this dimension appears in the visionary 
and mundane presences of indigenous persons. They are, however, no more, and no less, 
effective than any of the other cultural inter-texts—whether Amerindian, African, British, 
or U.S. popular culture—that are available to the speaker. The connection to Williams 
here bears mentioning. Although D’Aguiar effectively levels historical and mythic events 
in a way comparable to what Riddel sees in Paterson, he does not give us a poetics of 
play. D’Aguiar’s is really more of an anti-poetics, a view of language’s failure to cohere. 
Despite the availability of materials out of which to forge a coherent subjectivity, the 
speaker is unable to recover from all he has experienced in Jonestown. He witnesses the 
repeated wounding of love’s body: the speaker’s rape and sodomizing of young girls on 
the compound; his loss of Tikka who, after giving birth to twins, whose father, Jones 
learns, is not him, but the speaker, takes her child to the river and to an ambiguous and 
probably fatal end; and finally, his administering of the cyanide cocktail (“Drink, I was 
ordering them, Drink/ As I tapped out that tune on the trigger” [D’Aguiar’s 1998, 16]). 
Rather than shoring up subjectivity, these violently interwoven events only lead to the 
speaker’s condition of constant debilitation. 
But the poem nonetheless performs a ritual of anamnesis, perhaps more 
effectively because it posits no idealized healing or wholeness for the speaker’s traumas. 
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If we consider that D’Aguiar’s fictional Jonestown survivor undergoes a ritual process of 
separation, transition, and reincorporation, and that the text of Bill of Rights performs 
itself as a ritual of anamnesis against the kind of forgetting of the historical dimension 
that arguably made the real Jonestown possible, then perhaps we can say that D’Aguiar’s 
poem also revises the metonymic poetics that Riddel reads in Paterson.
6
 An interesting 
reading of Bill of Rights might open up by applying Victor Turner’s revision of Van 
Gennep’s middle stage (liminaire), in which liminality can show up positively as 
communitas, an unstructured community, where all members are equal. Read in this way, 
D’Aguiar’s speaker could be seen as occupying a permanent condition of liminality, 
since, even after his reincorporation into British and American cultures, he is haunted by 
memories of the Jonestown dead in ways that linguistic remembering cannot exorcise. 
Bill of Rights, in other words, would dramatize a stunted ritual, in which a final 
reincorporation into the social order has been foreclosed, and, in its place, a perpetual 
limbo has been substituted.  
In spite of the poem’s speaker’s liminality, D’Aguiar’s poetics re-create 
Jonestown in such a way that repositions it discursively to be a continued provocation to 
our collective memory. Provocation forms the basis, in turn, for a seizing and 
transformation of the past. Jay Wright, in his essay, “Desire’s Design, Vision’s 
Resonance,” finds ritual in traditional societies to fulfill not a dogmatic function but, on 
the contrary, a transformative one. It allows one “to look into experience and to go 
beyond what is merely given to invest it with a significance which enhances and 
restructures experience” (Wright 1987, 15). Rather than simply repeating experience in a 
                                                           
6
 In defining ritual structure I am using Arnold van Gennep’s three-part model from his 
1909 work, Rites of Passage (Les rites de passage). 
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lifeless way, ritual is the means for its engagement, reordering, and transformation. As 
with the speaker in D’Aguiar’s poem, a bill of rights emerges, however slowly, out of this 
reiterative process. Those rights ultimately include the right to suffer, even relentlessly 
suffer, as a means for transforming past traumas. And they include, of course, the right to 
a view onto an ever-opening horizon that is protected, through acts of memory, at least 
somewhat, from the encroachments of ideology. 
Metonymy alone will not save D’Aguiar’s speaker. The free play of language, 
even when the speaker thinks of himself as most free, is always threatened by ideology 
and by trauma to repeat itself. In spite of this, I suggest that a ritual reading of the poem’s 
poetics, where the Bill of Rights’ speaker, after his initial enthusiasm for Jonestown wears 
away, and after the physical and emotional violences of the place wear him down, is 
forced as almost an Orpheus to pass through a meaninglessness. This meaninglessness is 
located where the natural world confronts a human language that has grown horrifically 
small. At these crossroads, an evacuation occurs: only once language, and the speaker, 
are emptied of meaning can the process of reconstruction begin. This reconstruction, 
however, is necessarily represented in the poem as partial. While the poetic persona in 
Bill of Rights does in fact survive the mass suicide at Jonestown, he eventually ends up 
back in the United States. There, in his “first hotel since Jonestown” (here the suggestion 
that Jonestown was itself a kind of hotel, instead of a jungle compound, forces a 
reexamination of America’s transitory places and lifestyles), he throws out the Gideon 
bible and reads the phonebook, visited, horribly, by “the Devil” having “his way/ With 
us, with or without butter.” This sodomy vision does not end but only closes with the 
suggestion of its ongoing repetition, an eternal recurrence: “It was a case of rock me 
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again/ And again, and again, and again,/ And again, and again” (D’Aguiar 1998, 122). 
Elsewhere, the speaker is in Augusta, Maine, as a shut-in only visited regularly by his 
“friend,” a prostitute who gives him “a discount for her love” (D’Aguiar 1998, 133). 
Even there, a specter himself, he is haunted by the Jonestown dead, feeling himself to be 
walking “over a thousand dead” and fearing to move at all, lest the “pattern” of their 
dying overflow his memory, spill over into the present, and “scramble into a town full of 
dead” (D’Aguiar 1998, 128). 
The speaker is also cut off from his other past places and from the more stable 
identity or identities they represent. Before moving back to the U.S. from London, he is 
patient in a psychiatric hospital: his “new address --/ Denmark Hill,” is the site of King’s 
College’s Institute of Psychiatry. From his “locked ward,” he hears trains “clackety-clack 
to somewhere” he “can’t go: Chattanooga, Kalamazoo/ Or even Timbuctoo” (D’Aguiar 
1998, 132).  Although his healing is far from complete, the speaker’s physical and 
emotional journeys allow us to contemplate not only Jonestown’s physical brutality but 
also its narrow temporality from a new angle. As such, these journeys fulfill the 
recuperative function that D’Aguiar reads as being so crucial for Wilson Harris’s work, 
presenting to us as an act of contemplation “the opportunity for a reassessment of our 
present stance and past actions” (D’Aguiar 1998 “Made in Guyana,” 6).  
Although the poem remembers the terrors of Jonestown in explicit and sometimes 
bewildering detail, and although the speaker clearly suffers in the present from the 
experience of past traumas, the poem successfully performs an anamnesis. Indeed, it does 
so because the cultural and personal healings it depicts are necessarily provisional, 
incomplete: necessarily incomplete, because to be otherwise would entail a wiping out of 
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the past, which would be an equivalent ideological feat to that attempted by Jones on 
November 18, 1978. There is a sense that, despite this performance, and despite the 
momentary recuperation of a more expansive horizon than the claustrophobic one created 
by Jones’s omnipresent voice over the camp’s loudspeakers, another act of violence is 
immanent. There is, in other words, the sense that Jonestown, in being remembered, 
forms what Hélène Cixous calls a stigmata. Although D’Aguiar describes Jonestown as 
having left a psychic scar on both his poem’s speaker and on our larger collective 
memory, I suggest that its effects are different from a scar; rather, Jonestown remains an 
open wound, for D’Aguiar’s speaker and for us, a stigmata that “wounds and spurs, 
stimulates” (Cixous 2005, xiii). Bill of Rights does not cover up Jonestown’s memory but 
digs into its violence in the hope of opening up another possible future. As Cixous writes, 
“Traumatism as an opening to the future of the wound is the promise of a text” (Cixous 
2005, xiv). Cixous’s claim applies to all texts, potentially, but it is an especially apt 
characterization of the re-opening of Jonestown’s wound that D’Aguiar achieves, and 
achieves so powerfully, by virtue of engaging with a ritual process whose closure leaves 
us with more stings than salves, more impossibilities than answers. And in these 
impossibilities there is, paradoxically perhaps, hope. 
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